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“We shall call emotion  
an abrupt drop of consciousness 
 into the magical.” 
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Principal aims of the studies are to: 
 examine the influence of weather variables (sunshine, temperature, baro-
metric pressure, and humidity) on affective experience (Study I);  
 study individual differences in weather’s possible impact on positive and 
negative affect, as well as fatigue (Study I); 
 explore whether people can feel happy and sad at the same time, and if 
personality traits predict the probability of feeling happy and sad in a mixed 
way (Study II); 
 examine the influence of emotional experience and specific personality traits 
on the re-experiencing of personal past events (Study III). 
 investigate if, and to what degree, life satisfaction judgments are predicted 
by positive and negative affective experiences as well as by mixed emotions 
(Study IV);  
 study whether the relationships between the affective and cognitive compo-
nents of SWB vary across different countries or cultures, in terms of 
countries’ aggregate levels of personality traits, cultural values, and human 
development (Study IV); 
 analyze the meanings of the emotion term ‘anger’ in two similar Finno-Ugric 
languages, Estonian and Finnish, across different components of emotions 
(Study V);  
 find out the features of emotion most likely related to the experience of 
anger in Estonian and Finnish (Study V). 
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INTRODUCTION 
1. Experience of Emotions 
Human emotion is a complex phenomenon – the brain is constantly processing 
and integrating sensory information from the world, somatovisceral information 
from the body, and prior knowledge about objects and situations to produce an 
affective state. Moreover, information about the external world is translated into 
whether an object or situation is helpful or harmful, rewarding or threatening, 
and requiring approach or withdrawal (Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner, & Gross, 
2007). Emotions are elicited when something relevant happens to the indivi-
dual, having a direct bearing on their needs, goals, values, and general well-
being (Scherer, 2001, 2009). There are many theories about what generates 
emotion: however, this dissertation complies with the principles of the appraisal 
theory (Scherer, Shorr, & Johnstone, 2001). 
Appraisal of events is allegedly one of the six major components of emotion, 
in addition to psycho-physiological changes (bodily sensations), motor expres-
sions (face, voice, and gestures), action tendencies (behavioural responses, such 
as approach or avoidance), subjective experiences (feelings), and emotion regu-
lation (controlling the expression or intensity of emotions) (Ellsworth & 
Scherer, 2003; Fontaine, Scherer, Roesch, & Ellsworth, 2007). The essence of 
appraisal theory is the claim that emotions are elicited by evaluations 
(appraisals, interpretations) of events and situations (Roseman & Smith, 2001). 
Appraisals start the emotion process, initiating the physiological, expressive, 
behavioural, and other changes that comprise the resultant emotional state. 
Thus, it is evaluations of events, rather than events per se, that elicit an emotion 
(Roseman & Smith, 2001). In this dissertation the broad terms ‘emotional’ and 
‘affective’ experience are used interchangeably, referring to more sustained 
mood states felt during an event or a time period. Both represent people's on-
line or retrospective evaluations of the events that occur in their lives and the 
feelings they elicit. 
 
 
1.1. Environmental effects on emotional states 
People may hold many myths about what affects their feelings. One of the daily 
factors that is often believed to cause pleasant or unpleasant emotions is 
weather – sunshine makes people happy, whereas dark rainy days equal 
depressive mood. The main purpose of Study I was to connect weather records 
to emotion data, in order to find out if the popular claims have any truth to 
them. Watson (2000) has analyzed the most extensive data on this topic to date. 
He gathered over 20,000 daily mood assessments from several student samples 
and linked these with weather conditions for the corresponding days. Contrary 
to expectations, he found that mood is almost entirely unrelated to weather 
conditions. The only relevant finding from his research was that sunshine might 
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act on the intensity of both negative and positive affect. However, on dark and 
rainy days, average mood levels were reported. Watson (2000) considered the 
overestimation of the mood-related effects of weather as an example of an 
illusory correlation, which could extend the list of so-called urban legends. In 
Study I, we elaborated the research of Watson (2000) by using momentary 
ratings of affective states, which were collected by means of Experience 
Sampling Methodology (ESM; Scollon, Kim-Prieto, & Diener, 2003; see part 
3.2 of this dissertation). These ratings were linked with hourly weather data 
(temperature, relative humidity, barometric pressure, and luminance) from a 
local weather station (in Tartu, Estonia) for the same time period. Results 
showed that positive emotions increase somewhat with sunlight, and both 
positive and negative emotions are to a small amount intensified by temperature 
rise. Nevertheless, weather conditions alone have only a small impact on 
people’s emotional experience. For example, with each unit rise in absolute 
temperature both positive and negative affect increased as little as 0.006 and 
0.002 units, respectively (Study I). Sunshine appears to be of greater influence, 
especially to ratings of positive affect – with each unit rise in luminance, the 
increment of positive emotions was 0.028 units. However, increase in humidity 
and decrease in barometric pressure (which imply rainy weather) were not 
significantly or consistently related to changes in affective experience. There-
fore, regardless of some minor statistically significant effects, the relationships 
between weather variables and emotional states are not nearly as strong as could 
be inferred on basis of beliefs in folklore and popular culture. In the context of 
appraisal theory, it could be assumed that different individuals who appraise the 
same situation (for example, warm weather with high temperature) in signifi-
cantly different ways (e.g., disturbing or enjoyable) would experience different 
emotions (e.g., irritation or happiness); and a given individual who appraises the 
same situation in significantly different ways at different times (bright sunshine 
while working indoors the whole day or while having a picnic in park) would 
also feel different emotions (Roseman & Smith, 2001). But this applies only as 
far as weather is indeed perceived as something relevant that has a direct 
bearing on people’s needs, goals, values, and well-being. Yet, there seem to be 
psychological states that do depend more on external conditions than positive 
and negative affect. For example, the incidence of sleepiness and tiredness were 
considerably elevated in the cold and dark (Study I). All in all, with regard to 
prototypical emotions, there are a number of intra- and inter-personal factors 
that may affect emotional experience to a substantially larger degree than 
simply sunny or rainy weather. And it can also be concluded that people are not 






1.2. Relevance of emotional valence 
For more than half a century, emotion researchers have attempted to establish 
the underlying dimensional space that would most comprehensively account for 
similarities and differences in emotional experience. Over the years, there has 
been considerable disagreement about the number and nature of the dimensions 
that provide an optimal framework for studying emotions (Fontaine et al., 
2007). In studies of the structure of self-rated affect, two schemes have most 
repeatedly emerged. In a widely used circumplex model as proposed by Russell 
(1979) and colleagues (Russell & Carroll, 1999), these two dimensions are 
pleasantness (or valence) and arousal. This model opposes positively and 
negatively valenced affects along a single axis, which therefore create a bipolar 
valence dimension. Research has indicated that people sometimes report posi-
tive and negative feelings at the same time (Study II), meaning that if there is a 
negative correlation between positive and negative emotions, it cannot be a very 
strong one. This dissertation, hence, focuses on the second well-known 
approach to affect structure, which places positively and negatively valenced 
affects onto different axes – Positive Affect (PA) and Negative Affect (NA), 
respectively (Watson & Tellegen, 1985).  
These two dominant dimensions of emotional experience consistently 
emerge across various descriptor sets, time frames, response formats, rotational 
schemes, languages, and cultures (Allik & Realo, 1997; Almagor & Ben-Porath, 
1989; Watson & Clark, 1992). While PA reflects one's level of pleasurable 
engagement with the environment and serves as a cue to stay on course or to 
explore the environment, NA is a general factor of subjective distress playing a 
fundamental role in calibrating psychological systems and serving as a call for 
mental or behavioural adjustment (Cacioppo, 1999; Watson, 1988). As evidence 
of the separability of NA and PA dimensions, these experiences display some 
strikingly different properties – for example, distinct distributions over time 
(Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999). Namely, NA scores remain relati-
vely low in the absence of threat or danger, but quickly elevate in response to 
potential emergencies. Yet PA shows substantial variability across a very broad 
range, reflecting the fact that positive mood is primarily concerned with 
approach and appetitive behaviors and therefore related to endogenous rhythms 
(Watson et al., 1999). Thus, PA and NA are highly distinctive dimensions that 
reflect separate underlying systems. These two adaptive systems must be in 
communication with – and be influenced by – one another (Watson et al., 
1999). 
About 24 years ago, Watson, Clark, and Tellegen (1988) proposed the Posi-
tive Affect Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS), which consists of two brief 10-
item scales to measure PA and NA. Their original publication (Watson et al., 
1988) has since then been cited 6,982 times (as at July 23rd, 2012) in the Web of 
Science. Watson and colleagues (1988) argued that the PANAS scales are 
internally consistent and have excellent convergent and discriminant corre-
lations with lengthier measures of underlying mood factors. Later it has been 
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shown in large samples that PANAS is indeed a reliable and valid measure of 
the constructs it was intended to assess. Demographic variables have only very 
modest influences on PANAS scores and PANAS exhibits measurement 
invariance across demographic subgroups (Crawford & Henry, 2004). The 
hierarchical bipartite structure of emotion terms has been replicated in several 
other languages, including a non-Indo-European language, Estonian (Allik & 
Realo, 1997). In this dissertation, PANAS has been used for measuring retro-
spective affective experience in Studies I and III. In Study I, we also 
constructed scales of PA, NA, and Fatigue, using experience-sampling ratings 
of basic emotions as well as other emotion-related adjectives. In Study IV, the 
scales of PA and NA were created on the basis of the emotional experience 
items employed in the European Social Survey Round 3. In Studies II and V 
specific positive and/or negative emotion terms were examined in depth. 
 
 
1.3. Mixed positive and negative emotions 
According to Watson and Clark (1992), the two general affect dimensions of 
PA and NA are, at least in self-report, only weakly correlated and therefore 
relatively independent of each other (Watson & Clark, 1992). Yet, PA and NA 
are not entirely unbound, because in the case of extremely intense NA levels in 
critical situations, the currently nonessential PA system may be temporarily 
inhibited (Watson et al., 1999). It has indeed been demonstrated that people do 
not simultaneously experience both positive and negative affect at very intense 
levels (Diener & Iran-Nejad, 1986). The bipolarity of PA and NA is also 
supported from the linguistic point of view which states that “pleasantness and 
unpleasantness are opposites” (Beebe-Center, 1932, p. 3; cf. Schimmack, 2001). 
But it nevertheless appears that the levels of positive and negative affect that 
one experiences are not too tightly linked (Diener & Iran-Nejad, 1986). Positive 
and negative affect can occur rather independently over time, because low 
levels of one type of emotion are compatible with any level of the other type of 
emotion. So, average levels of positive and negative affect can be independent 
across persons, because most affect occurs at non-intense levels (Diener & Iran-
Nejad, 1986).  
In Study II, the examination of the relationship between PA and NA was 
taken a step further. Namely, instead of broad affect scales, momentary ratings 
of specific linguistic antonyms, happy and sad, were analyzed. As the data were 
gathered from over a hundred individuals in the course of a two-week expe-
rience sampling experiment, the moment-to-moment connections between 
emotions could be studied both at the intra- and inter-individual level. Results 
demonstrated that no strict bipolarity exists even between happiness and 
sadness. In fact, momentary ratings of these two emotions were only moderately 
negatively correlated: the Pearson product moment correlation between sadness 
and happiness across all the single measurement trials was r = –.17 (p < .001). 
For each of the 110 participants, there were on the average 80 measurement 
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trials over the couple of weeks of the experiment. Across individuals, the 
cumulative distribution of within-person correlations between happiness and 
sadness ranged from –.73 to .35, with the mean being close to –.20 (SD = .21). 
However, the correlation between the averaged ratings of happiness and sadness 
across all measurement trials was positive, though statistically insignificant  
(r = .13, p = .166). This suggests that for each and every person, feeling happy 
does not necessarily imply the absence of feeling sad at the same time (see 
Figure 1 for the relationship between the averaged estimations of happiness and 
sadness across all participants). This is consistent with the findings of Larsen 
and McGraw (2011) who stated that, in specific situations, many people can 
feel even these discrete emotions simultaneously. Yet, there are people who 
indeed cannot be happy when they are sad, and vice versa – about 14% of all 
participants never reported mixed feelings over the entire course of the 
experiment in Study II. Research has shown that the tendency to experience 
overlapping positive and negative moods is stable over time within persons and 
varies broadly across individuals (Rafaeli, Rogers, & Revelle, 2007).  
 
 
Figure 1. Bivariate distribution of the averaged estimations of happiness and sadness 
for the 110 participants (r = .13, p = .166; Study II). 
 
 
Study II also revealed some personality differences in the tendency to simulta-
neously experience positive and negative emotions, which will be reported in 
the next part of this dissertation. Even more, the experience of mixed emotions 
seems to depend on cultural context. Whether and when mixed feelings will be 
reported probably depends on the cultural style of interpreting emotional 






















situations – some cultures find it important to foresee negative consequences of 
positive events, whereas others encourage positive reappraisals of negative 
situations (Miyamoto, Uchida, & Ellsworth, 2010). Altogether, the relationship 
between positive and negative affect is not invariably organized into a bipolar 
or independent bivariate structure. Pleasure and displeasure seem to be two 
separate affects that are reciprocally related in intensities, yet not mutually 
exclusive in momentary ratings (Schimmack, 2001). But when we analyze 
affective experience at the retrospective or between-subject level – happiness 
and sadness appear to be almost independent or even slightly positively 
correlated (Study II). Examining the degree of interaction between positive and 
negative emotions is not only an interesting field of study in itself, but it can 
also have significant implications to other psychological phenomena, such as 
general subjective well-being. For example, in Study IV it was found that the 
more people have experienced both positive and negative feelings over the past 




2. Emotional Experience in Relation to Personality  
Personality traits are dimensions of individual differences in relatively consis-
tent patterns of actions, thoughts, and feelings (McCrae & Costa, 1990). The 
dominant personality theory in modern academic psychology is the five-factor 
model (FFM), which is a hierarchical organization of personality traits in terms 
of five basic dimensions: Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to Experience, 
Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness (McCrae & John, 1992). Ever since 
antiquity, starting with Galen’s classification of the four different humors 
(Irwin, 1947; cf. Scherer, Wranik, Sangsue, Tran, & Scherer, 2004), it has been 
assumed that individuals differ in their predisposition to experience certain 
emotions (Scherer et al., 2004). Nowadays, research has confirmed that there 
are systematic relations between self-rated affect and the Big Five personality 
traits (e.g., Allik & Realo, 1997). The emotion system has therefore also been 
considered as a subsystem of personality (Reisenzein & Weber, 2009). Two 
traits especially, Neuroticism and Extraversion, are thought to represent basic 
dimensions of affective temperament – neurotics and extraverts have a tempera-
mental susceptibility to experience NA and PA, respectively (Watson & Clark, 
1984, 1997). 
Neuroticism is associated with pervasive feelings of distress and dissatis-
faction. Individuals high in Neuroticism report elevated levels of nervousness, 
fear, guilt, shame, dissatisfaction, self-loathing, sadness, loneliness, anger, 
irritability, fatigue, and timidity, and lower levels of relaxation and confidence. 
Extraversion is broadly related to mood terms that lie at the very core of the 
positive affect dimension, such as happy, cheerful, enthusiastic, and lively 
(Watson, 2000). In fact, happiness has been considered “a thing called stable 
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Extraversion” (Francis, 1999; Schimmack, Radhakrishnan, Oishi, Dzokoto, & 
Ahadi, 2002). As a possible explanation to this regularity, Watson (2000) has 
suggested that Neuroticism and Extraversion are associated with significant 
affect-producing life circumstances. More specifically, maladaptive personality 
characteristics of those high in Neuroticism may actively generate stressful 
events (and adverse life circumstances are at least partly responsible for their 
elevated levels of negative mood); Extraversion, on the other hand, is related to 
greater socializing and engaging in more pleasurable activities (Watson, 2000). 
The pattern of associations between affect and personality domains is also 
generalizable across languages and cultures. The general associations between 
Neuroticism and NA and between Extraversion and PA appear to be truly 
universal and independent of any particular language and culture (Allik & 
Realo, 1997). 
However, the connection between personality dispositions and affect is more 
diverse than the nearly self-explanatory Neuroticism–NA and Extraversion–PA 
associations. The affective nature of the other three FFM personality disposi-
tions is somewhat less obvious. For example, research has indicated that low 
Agreeableness is related to negative emotionality, such as trait anger, hostility, 
and anger expression (Kuppens, 2005), meaning that agreeable individuals 
experience lower levels of anger, irritability, and scorn than do those who are 
more antagonistic. Conscientiousness is correlated with attentiveness, which is 
part of PA: conscientious individuals report higher levels of determination, 
concentration, and alertness (Watson, 2000). Finally, individuals who score 
high on Openness to Experience seem to be more emotionally sensitive to art 
and beauty, and according to some studies also tend to experience a wider range 
of feelings and emotions than people low on this trait. Higher openness could 
thus also be related to emotional differentiation (McCrae, 2007; McCrae & 
Sutin, 2009). Other research has, however, shown that Openness to Experience 
appears to stay apart from human emotions and feelings, because only a very 
small amount of its content can be predicted from all measures of affect (Allik 
& Realo, 1997; Watson, 2000). 
Besides being closely related to discrete emotions and affective dimensions, 
personality differences also help to explain emotional complexity. In Study II, 
where the co-occurrence of momentary happiness and sadness was examined, it 
was found that all Big Five traits, except Agreeableness, predict the tendency to 
experience mixed momentary positive and negative emotions. At the level of 
specific facets, mixed emotions were positively related to N3: Depression, N5: 
Impulsiveness, and O4: Openness to actions, whereas negatively to C3: 
Dutifulness. In other words, people who reported mixed emotions were more 
likely to act on cravings, need environmental stimulation, tend to be open to 
new experiences on a practical level, find it irrelevant to fulfill moral 
obligations, and have lower levels of floating anxiety (Study II). As personality 
traits involve individual differences in patterns of thoughts, they are, together 
with emotional experience, closely related to other cognitive processes, such as 
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the functioning of episodic memory. In Study III we examined the relationship 
between personality and the most characteristic feature of episodic memory – 
the feeling of re-experiencing memories and mental time-travel into the past 
(Tulving, 2002). Memory re-experiencing was explored at the most specific 
(evaluating a concrete episode from one’s personal past) and the most abstract 
level (assessing one’s overall tendency to relive autobiographical memories). In 
the case of single episode reliving, it was surprisingly found that specific perso-
nality traits had an even stronger influence on the feeling of re-experiencing 
than retrospective reports of PA and NA. It was shown that, in addition to 
emotion-related traits, personality facets which were also tied to self-regulation 
and shyness (such as N4: Self-Consciousness, N5: Immoderation, A5: Modesty, 
C2: Orderliness, and C5: Self-Discipline) can make relevant contributions to the 
tendency to vividly re-experience personal memories (Study III). This finding 
demonstrates that even the retrieval of very specific information about one's 
personal past is influenced by constructions of the self, including self-image, 
goals, and expectations (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). 
Most of the data reported above have mainly dealt with direct and explicit 
connections between personality and emotions. However, in Studies I and IV, 
the less straightforward influence of personality on different individual pro-
cesses was examined. Multilevel modeling was used in order to consider indivi-
dual differences in personality as person-level moderators of other emotion-
related psychological processes. The idea behind these analyses was to explore 
if weather influences the affective experience of different individuals in similar 
or dissimilar ways (Study I) and whether differences in national mean levels of 
personality traits affect the relevance of recent emotional experience in forming 
life satisfaction judgments across different countries (Study IV). In Study I, 
personality traits of students and elderly people were analyzed as between-
subject moderators of weather’s effect on the within-subject emotional expe-
rience. As a result, personality was found to explain only a slight portion of 
variance in weather’s impact on affective states. Conscientiousness in particular 
appeared to moderate some relationships between emotional experience and 
weather indicators; however, the effects were marginal in magnitude. All in all, 
the age of participants seems to have a much greater impact on the weather–
affect relationship than differences in basic personality domains. In Study IV, 
the moderating influence of personality on life satisfaction judgments was 
examined at the level of European countries. We explored if countries’ 
aggregated scores of Neuroticism and Extraversion influence the individual-
level relationship between life satisfaction and emotional experience. It was 
shown that national scores of Extraversion and Neuroticism significantly 
influenced the connection between having recently experienced mixed emotions 
and being satisfied with one’s life. The connections between PA and NA on the 
one hand and life satisfaction on the other were, however, not moderated by 
national-level personality scores. Therefore, the way in which citizens of a 
country on the average tend to describe themselves (in terms of how extraverted 
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and neurotic they are) influences the weight of emotional complexity in life 
satisfaction judgments, but has no impact on the separate effects of positive and 
negative emotions.  
In conclusion, personality traits are connected to emotions in several ways 
and on different levels, making the relationship between personality and 
emotional experience rather complex. 
 
 
3. Emotions and Memory Recall 
Emotions and cognitive processes coexist, interact with one another and contri-
bute to experience in every moment of our lives (Hektner, Schmidt, & 
Csickszentmihalyi, 2007). Although scientists are used to thinking about 
cognitive events (such as thoughts, memories, and beliefs) as separate from 
emotional events, this distinction is probably phenomenological rather than 
causal and does not seem to be respected by the brain (Barrett et al., 2007). The 
tight interconnectedness of emotions and memory, in particular, has probably 
received the most attention in literature. In their review, Kensinger and Schacter 
(2008) recognize that there are at least three broad influences of emotion on 
memory: the amount of accurate detail remembered about prior experiences, the 
number (quantity) of events remembered, and the subjective vividness (quality) 
of the remembered events (Kensinger & Schacter, 2008). In Study III, we 
focused on the last influence – our aim was to examine the phenomenology or 
quality of memory experiences, instead of accurateness or event contents. 
It is widely known and also scientifically demonstrated that emotionally 
intense events are often more likely to be remembered than non-emotional ones, 
and that the amygdala appears to be critical for this quantitative memory boost. 
Emotional memories are often re-experienced with tremendous vividness. But 
in addition to intensity or arousal, the valence of an event (whether it elicits 
positive or negative affect) also seems to have an impact on whether and how 
the episode is remembered. In general, the literature suggests that negative 
affect focuses attention on intrinsic sensory details, leading to the retention of 
more accurate details, whereas positive affect involves conceptual processes and 
increases the likelihood that the gist of an event is remembered, but that its 
details are forgotten (Kensinger & Schacter, 2008). Individuals appear to differ 
dramatically in how well they remember emotional events, and one important 
contributor to this difference may be how individuals regulate their emotions 
(Richards & Gross, 2006). Study III demonstrated that the overall feeling of 
reliving episodes from the personal past is significantly related to emotional 
experience, whether in the form of shorter-range retrospective evaluations (PA 
of past few weeks) or as relatively stable personality traits (N3: Depression, O3: 
Emotionality, E6: Cheerfulness). These three personality facets can be thought 
of as dispositional mood measured as personality attributes of the individual. To 
sum up, a larger range and richness of emotional experiences enhance the 
feeling of reliving personal memories. 
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3.1. Memory biases related to emotions 
A human memory is never a perfect record of a life experience (Richards & 
Gross, 2006). After more than one century, advances in psychology and neuro-
biology show that we memorize only parts of the experience; we interpret them 
and we associate them with previous similar situations. Memory distortions are 
one of the most well-known errors in our information processing (Hektner et al., 
2007). While emotional memories are reconstructed at the time of retrieval, they 
are prone to memory biases and inconsistencies (Holland & Kensinger, 2010). 
Emotion affects the information that becomes a part of the memory trace, as 
well as the information that is accessible for recall. The emotion that we feel at 
retrieval, or that we want to feel, can have a particularly strong influence on the 
way in which we reconstruct past experiences and past emotions. Those 
affective characteristics that have been suggested to influence how vividly a 
memory is remembered are arousal, personal importance, and valence (Holland 
& Kensinger, 2010). 
Research has revealed several memory biases related to emotional experien-
ce that either enhance or impair the recall of a memory, or that alter the content 
of a reported memory. First, people evaluate certain kinds of past affective 
experience by referencing to just a few selected moments. That is to say, on 
many occasions, global evaluations of past emotional events are well predicted 
by a simple average of two privileged moments: the most intense affective 
moment of that experience (the peak affect) and the affect experienced at its end 
(the final experienced affect that concluded the experience). Empirical support 
for the peak-and-end rule is robust (Fredrickson, 2000; Fredrickson & Kahne-
man, 1993; Redelmeier, Katz, & Kahneman, 2003). Second, positive mood has 
been associated with more memory reconstruction errors than negative mood, 
most likely because individuals in a happy mood rely on gist-based information 
or on heuristics, while individuals in a negative mood are more likely to focus 
on the specific details of information (cf. Kensinger & Schacter, 2008). Third, 
people's recollections of the past are often positively biased. People perceive 
events in their lives to be pleasant more often than unpleasant. The affect 
associated with unpleasant events fades faster than the affect associated with 
pleasant events (although dysphoria or mild depression disrupts such bias) 
(Walker, Skowronski, & Thompson, 2003). According to some studies, posi-
tivity bias might characterize information processing, especially in the elderly 
(Goeleven, De Raedt, & Dierckx, 2010) – aging often involves a decrease in the 
experience of negative affect and is associated with stabilization, or even a 
slight increase, in the experience of positive affect (Mroczek & Kolarz, 1998). 
Positivity bias is also manifested in the process of autobiographical recollection 
– it appears that positively-valenced memories are accompanied by a greater 
feeling of re-experiencing (Study III).  
And fourth, mood states are known to influence memory and judgment in a 
mood-congruent manner. Namely, people more easily learn and remember 
material that is in an emotional tone that is congruent with their current mood 
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than material that is incongruent with their mood, because mood-congruent 
concepts have been activated in the memory (see Bower, 1981, for the network 
theory of affect). Positive mood states are therefore thought to increase the 
tendency to make positive judgments and retrieve positive memories; negative 
mood states should increase the tendency to make negative judgments and 
retrieve negative memories (Rusting, 1999). In Study III, participants rated the 
emotional valence of a recollected memory episode, as well as their experience 
of PA and NA during the past few weeks. Results showed that recent PA was 
indeed significantly related to the positive valence, and NA to the negative 
valence, of the memory episode, but these relationships were rather weak (r = 
.17, p < .001, and r = .10, p < .05, respectively). There are at least two possible 
explanations for this weak association: (1) experiences of PA and NA were 
rated for the past few weeks, not for the current moment; and (2) at times, 
people retrieve positive memories even in negative moods – the phenomenon of 
thinking of positive memories while being sad has been termed mood-
incongruent memory or mood repair (Parrott & Sabini, 1990). 
 
 
3.2. Recalling past emotional experience 
In emotion research, it must also be asked if retrospective self-reports of 
affective experience are reliable. People often remember past experiences – and 
their emotional reactions to those experiences – through a distorted lens 
(Holland & Kensinger, 2010). Distortions in emotion-memory are most likely to 
be observed when marked changes have occurred in people’s emotions, goals, 
and beliefs in the meantime. Under these conditions, people appear to use their 
current feelings about and appraisals of past experiences to infer how they must 
have felt when these experiences first took place (Levine & Safer, 2002). 
Global evaluations of past affective experiences are not merely perceived or 
felt; they are constructed (Fredrickson, 2000). Failing to adjust for post-event 
experience leads to inaccuracies in retrospective (and also prospective) judg-
ments of emotion (Levine & Safer, 2002). Biases in memory for emotion occur 
as a function of current emotions, appraisals, and coping efforts, as well as of 
personality. Such biases have been found for both positive and negative 
emotions, for everyday emotional experiences, and for intense emotions 
associated with surprising and personally-consequential events (Levine & Safer, 
2002). However, some of the pitfalls associated with traditional self-reports, 
such as memory biases and the use of global heuristics, can be avoided by using 
ESM experiments.  
ESM (also called ecological momentary assessment) was proposed as a tool 
to separate on-line experiences from recall and global biases (Larson & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1983; Scollon et al., 2003; Stone & Shiffman, 1994). This is 
possible because, in ESM, not much room for recall bias exists between the 
signal and the response, because of the shortness of the time lag between the 
two moments. In short, ESM refers to a method of data collection in which 
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participants respond to repeated assessments at different moments over the 
course of time, while functioning within their natural settings (Barrett & Barrett, 
2001; Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987; Hektner et al., 2007; Scollon et al., 
2003). In Studies I and II, ESM was employed to examine momentary ratings 
of affective states over a two-week period. In Study II, we measured the extent 
of two specific emotions (happy and sad) in two ways. In addition to the 
momentary ratings from the ESM experiment, participants also filled in the 
PANAS at the end of the experiment, thereby retrospectively assessing the same 
emotions for the last couple of weeks (i.e., the exact interval of the experiment). 
When the momentary (ESM) ratings of emotions were averaged for each person 
and then compared with the retrospective assessments, rather good agreement 
resulted. The correlations were r = .52 and .60, for happiness and sadness, 
respectively (p < .001), meaning that retrospective ratings did contain accurate 
information about momentary emotions. But it also means that there was about 
70% of variance in emotional experience that was not in common between the 
two types of ratings. This example from Study II clearly indicates the signifi-
cance of sampling specific moment-to-moment experiences in emotion research. 
Nevertheless, bias in memory for emotion is natural, because the primary 
function of memory is not to serve as an undying record of the past, but rather 
to guide goal-directed action (Levine & Safer, 2002). 
Another relevant advantage of ESM is that it takes psychology out of the 
laboratory and into real-life situations, thus increasing its ecological validity 
(Scollon et al., 2003; Stone & Shiffman, 1994). ESM has the unique ability to 
capture daily life as it is directly perceived from one moment to the next, 
affording an opportunity to examine fluctuations in the stream of consciousness 
and the links between the external context and the contents of the mind 
(Hektner et al., 2007). Involving questions about external circumstances was 
especially important in Study I, where the influence of weather on affective 
experience was analyzed. Taking into account the individuals’ whereabouts at 
the time of signal was essential, because nowadays people spend a lot of their 
time indoors, where there is no direct contact with atmospheric phenomena. 
Altogether, the main strength of experience sampling lies in its ability to 
provide fine-grained, detailed pictures of human experience (Scollon et al., 
2003). 
 
4. The Emotional Component of Subjective Well-Being 
Subjective well-being (SWB), a key component of quality of life, is a broad 
category of phenomena that includes people's emotional responses, domain 
satisfactions, and global judgments of life satisfaction (Diener, Suh, Lucas, & 
Smith, 1999). SWB can be considered an umbrella term used to describe the 
level of well-being people experience according to their subjective evaluations 
of their lives. These evaluations, which can be both positive and negative, 
include judgments and feelings about life satisfaction, interest and engagement, 
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affective reactions such as joy and sadness in relation to life events, and 
satisfaction with work, relationships, health, recreation, meaning and purpose, 
and other important domains (Diener & Ryan, 2009). 
Definitions of SWB distinguish a cognitive and an affective (or hedonic) 
component of SWB. The cognitive component is an individual’s life satisfaction 
(LS) – evaluations of one’s life according to subjectively-determined standards 
(Schimmack et al., 2002). According to the cognitive approach to well-being, a 
theoretical model called AIM (abbreviation of Attention, Interpretation and 
Memory; Diener & Biswas-Diener, 2008), the way in which people interpret 
(evaluate, appraise) the world has as much, or even more, to do with their 
happiness than what is actually going on in their world. The processes of 
attending to some events and not others, of interpreting ambiguous events in 
positive rather than negative ways, and of tending to recall the good times 
instead of the bad times from the past are about the internal processes of being 
happy. Our daily interpretation of things determines our feelings of well-being 
(Diener & Biswas-Diener, 2008; cf. Diener & Ryan, 2009).  
The affective component is an individual’s (actual or perceived) hedonic 
balance (i.e., the balance between pleasant affect and unpleasant affect). When 
respondents form an LS judgment, they retrieve past pleasant and unpleasant 
events from memory. The ratio of pleasant memories to unpleasant memories is 
used as one source of information in judging LS (Schimmack et al., 2002), and 
SWB researchers therefore include measures of both pleasant and unpleasant 
affect in their research (Diener et al., 1999). Kuppens, Realo, and Diener (2008) 
demonstrated that, across nations, positive and negative emotions contribute 
independently to satisfaction with life: positive emotions are positively and 
negative emotions negatively related to LS. In Study IV, the same was found 
for the twenty-one countries participating in the European Social Survey 
(Round 3 in 2006). However, while in the Kuppens and colleagues’ (2008) 
study the experience of positive emotions was twice as strongly related to LS 
judgments as negative emotions, the difference between the effects of PA and 
NA on LS was less remarkable in Study IV.  
 
 
4.1. The role of mixed emotions in SWB 
The essential role of positive emotions in SWB has been widely acknowledged, 
but is it necessary for people to be euphorically happy all of the time in order to 
achieve a better life? Research says no: constant euphoria is not a desired 
outcome. Endless striving for higher levels of well-being could also lead an 
individual to more risk-seeking and potentially dangerous behaviors (Diener & 
Ryan, 2009). Whereas much theory and research motivated by positive 
psychology has focused on the beneficial effects of positive emotions on health 
outcomes, it has been proposed that coping with severe stressors requires not 
only experiencing positive emotions but also experiencing and grappling with 
the negative feelings associated with the stressor (Larsen, McGraw, & 
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Cacioppo, 2001). Studies on emotion regulation strategies have indicated that 
experiencing negative emotions can also contribute to psychological well-being. 
North and colleagues (2011) speculate that accepting one’s negative emotions 
(psychological acceptance) and then trying to seek out positive aspects (positive 
reappraisal) might be an optimal strategy for building happiness (North et al., 
2011). And as we know from Study II, at many times people do report 
experiencing linguistically opposite emotions (happiness and sadness) even 
simultaneously.  
In Study IV, we therefore also examined the role of emotional complexity 
(meaning a non-linear interaction between positive and negative emotions) in 
well-being. For that purpose, a correlation between experiencing PA and NA 
(over the past week) was calculated for each individual (using Asendorpf's 
formula; see Asendorpf, 1992, for details), resulting in an index of mixed 
emotions. It was demonstrated that retrospective mixed emotions had a positive 
effect on LS judgments, meaning that the more an individual is inclined to 
experience both types of affect within a time period, the higher his or her LS; 
however, this effect was weaker than in the case of analyzing PA and NA 
independently. In sum, Study IV supports the idea of Oishi and colleagues 
(Oishi, Diener, & Lucas, 2007), who stated that there is more to psychological 
well-being than just high levels of happiness; it is also an intense and multi-
faceted emotional life that makes people satisfied with their lives. 
 
 
5. Emotions across Cultures and Languages 
5.1. Cultural moderators of SWB 
The contribution of differently-valenced feelings to SWB is not invariable 
throughout the world – how the experience of positive and negative emotions 
relates to the good life depends on the values that characterize one’s society 
(Kuppens et al., 2008). The relation between hedonic balance and life satis-
faction has been shown to be significantly stronger in individualistic cultures 
than in collectivistic cultures (Suh, Diener, Oishi, & Triandis, 1998), because 
individualistic cultures place more importance on emotions (Schimmack et al., 
2002). In the study by Kuppens and others (2008), individualist countries 
seemed to have a heightened sensitivity precisely to negative emotions, which 
means that individualist cultural values emphasized the minimization of displea-
sure and negative feelings for attaining satisfaction with life more, compared to 
collectivist cultural values (although positive emotions show a stronger overall 
relation with life satisfaction than do negative emotions). However, in Study 
IV, individualism had no statistically significant direct influence on LS; 
likewise, it did not moderate the relationship between the cognitive and affec-
tive components of SWB. This could be explained by the relatively individua-
listic nature of most European countries, compared to many other parts of the 
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world – Kuppens et al (2008) used data from, altogether, 46 countries, including 
African, Asian, and Middle East nations. 
Additionally, while it has been demonstrated that, in nations that emphasize 
self-expression values (Inglehart, 1997), positive emotional experiences were 
more strongly related to life satisfaction than in nations in which members are 
focused on daily survival (Kuppens et al., 2008), Study IV showed the 
contrary. We found that, with increasing survival values (and at the same time 
with the decreasing level of human development, which is strongly related to 
survival/self-expression), the effect of PA (as well as mixed emotions) on life 
satisfaction became stronger. This discrepancy in the results from Study IV and 
Kuppens et al (2008) could be explained by sample composition. The former 
had a representative sample of 40,487 people across 21 European countries, 
whereas the latter employed merely young student samples (from the Inter-
national College Survey 2001). Hence, Study IV emphasizes the importance of 
employing representative samples in cross-cultural research as the age and 
status variance of participants can have a profound impact on results. 
 
 
5.2. Equivalence in emotion research 
Conducting cross-cultural research on emotional experience requires es-
tablishing a degree of equivalence in emotion terms (Study V) as well as 
measurement scales (Study IV). Understanding emotional experience across 
different cultures, nations, and languages is therefore complicated. People 
cannot describe their feelings and emotional states without using emotion words. 
Those words, however, may carry different meanings in different cultures or 
even within one culture. In fact, there seems to be no word-for-word match in 
the emotion lexicons of various languages (Ogarkova, Soriano, & Lehr, 2012). 
Therefore, an interesting question is whether an emotion word is translatable 
from one language or cultural context to another. The concept of equivalence in 
lexical research on emotions largely resides on the idea that two emotion 
words/expressions should share the same meaning to be considered equivalent 
(cf. Ogarkova et al., 2012). 
Study V was part of the international GRID project, which is a worldwide 
study of the semantics of emotion terms using a componential approach. By 
means of the translation/back-translation procedure, the original English GRID 
instrument was translated into many world languages, including Estonian and 
Finnish, which are two culturally and linguistically related Finno-Ugric 
languages. Estonian- and Finnish-speaking participants were asked to evaluate 
prototypical emotion terms on many different features that covered all six of the 
major components of emotion: appraisals of events, psycho-physiological 
changes, motor expressions, action tendencies, subjective experiences, and 
emotion regulation (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). It was found that emotion 
terms in English are not always easily translatable into other languages. More 
specifically, in Estonian and Finnish, the boundary between close emotions 
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anger and hate is not drawn in exactly the same place as in English. The 
meaning of the term anger is very similar in Estonian and Finnish, but emotion 
meaning profiles are even more similar for the word “viha”, which means anger 
in Estonian, but hate in Finnish (Study V). In sum, it is important to take into 
account the richness and variability of word meaning across even similar 
languages. 
Further, in cross-cultural research, it is essential to ask if respondents from 
different cultures interpret a given measure in a conceptually similar manner 
(Vandenberg & Lance, 2000) and whether members of different cultures ascribe 
the same meanings to scale items (Milfont & Fischer, 2010). When comparing 
nations, an assumption is made that an instrument measures the same psycho-
logical construct in all nations. If this assumption holds, the comparisons are 
valid and differences/similarities between groups can be meaningfully inter-
preted. However, if this assumption does not hold, comparisons and inter-
pretations may not be meaningful. Therefore, researchers should explicitly 
evaluate the equivalence of measures (or measurement invariance) and then 
distinguish between different levels of similarity or equivalence (Milfont & 
Fischer, 2010; Study IV). Psychological constructs, such as the subjective 
experience of emotion, constitute latent variables that cannot be measured 
directly. For example, in Study IV, the latent factors of interest were NA and 
PA. As a result, psychological measures function as indicators of the latent 
construct. The indicators of NA in our study were four negative mood 
adjectives – depressed, lonely, sad, and anxious; indicators of PA were four 
positive states – happy, peaceful, enjoying life, and having a lot of energy. In 
order to meaningfully compare latent constructs across groups, each observed 
indicator must relate to the latent variable in the same way across all groups (i.e. 
the 21 European countries in Study IV). In establishing the comparability of 
countries, the most important question is whether the constructs exist at all in 
every nation of interest (known as functional invariance). Thereafter, it has to 
be gradually determined if the measurement scales have the same structure 
(configural invariance), the same factor loadings (metric invariance), and 
eventually, the same item intercepts (scalar invariance) across countries 
(Milfont & Fischer, 2010). In Study IV, these models were examined using 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) which is one of the most widely used 
methods to test for measurement invariance, and is becoming increasingly 
popular (Milfont & Fischer, 2010). But more specifically, a multilevel CFA 
(MCFA) was conducted, because the ESS data consisted of two levels: the level 
of individuals (within countries) and level of the twenty-one countries. MCFA 
decomposes the total sample covariance matrix into pooled within- and 
between-group covariance matrices and uses these two matrices in the analyses 
of the factor structure at each level. After consecutively running all necessary 
models, support for the scalar invariance model was found – the goodness-of-fit 
index, RMSEA, was 0.034 (χ2 = 827.73, df = 35), indicating a good fit. Thus, it 
was demonstrated that the item intercepts of NA and PA were invariant at the 
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levels of within and between countries and we were permitted to make 
comparisons across the twenty-one European countries.  
In sum, it is necessary to explore emotional experience across cultures, but 
differences in cultural values, languages, and levels of human development 
complicate the interpretation of results. Therefore, such research can only be 
conducted on the condition that a reasonable degree of equivalence is met in 
how the specific terms and broader scales of emotion are understood from one 




To sum up, the main conclusions of this dissertation are the following: 
 
 Weather has a relatively small impact on people’s emotions. While PA is to 
some degree enhanced by sunlight and both PA and NA are slightly 
intensified by temperature, weather has a significantly greater impact on the 
physiologically-based feelings of sleepiness and tiredness. Fatigue appears to 
decrease as temperature and luminance rise (Study I). 
 People rarely experience both great happiness and sadness simultaneously, 
but low levels of one emotion are more compatible with any level of the 
other emotion. For some people, it is indeed possible to be happy and sad at 
the same time. Momentary mixed emotions are more likely to be felt by 
people who score lower in Conscientiousness and higher in Neuroticism, 
Extraversion, and Openness to Experience (Study II). 
 Retrospectively-rated mixed affect influences people’s subjective well-being 
(SWB), but the separate effects of PA and NA on life satisfaction are 
considerably higher. Thus, when forming a life satisfaction judgment both 
the presence of positive and absence of negative emotional experiences are 
important, but emotional complexity also makes a small contribution to 
overall SWB (Study IV). 
 A rich affective life, which is represented by emotion-related personality 
traits and retrospective affective experience, has a relevant impact on 
recollecting one’s past. Both emotional intensity (O3: Emotionality) as well 
as positive (E6: Cheerfulness and retrospective PA) and negative (N3: 
Depression) valence are related to the increased reliving of personal 
memories; reliving is also subject to positivity bias (Study III). 
 Emotional experience is not equally important in life satisfaction judgments 
across different countries, because, depending on cultural factors, people 
might put unequal emphasis on positive and negative emotions. For example, 
PA and mixed emotions enhance life satisfaction judgments across Europe, 
but especially in countries where survival is valued more highly. Therefore, 
it is essential to examine the emotional component of subjective well-being 
cross-culturally, whereas all countries under study need to be representa-
tively sampled as well (Study IV).  
 Cross-cultural emotion research might be subject to different equivalence 
concerns – one of them being the comparability of emotion-word meanings. 
Emotion terms in English are not always unequivocally translatable into 
other languages. Considering the appearance of slight meaning differences in 
a common emotion word (anger) even across two linguistically close 
languages (Estonian and Finnish), it is important to take into account the 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Emotsionaalne kogemus:  
Seosed isiksuse, subjektiivse heaolu,  
meenutamise ja välisteguritega 
Väitekiri käsitleb inimeste emotsionaalset kogemust erinevatest vaatenurkadest, 
otsides sealjuures teaduslikku põhjendust ka mõnele populaarsele tõekspida-
misele. Lähtutakse peamiselt kolmest teoreetilisest postulaadist: (1) emotsioo-
nide tekkimise aluseks on olukordadele kognitiivsete hinnangute-tähenduste 
omistamine (Scherer, 2001), (2) positiivsed ja negatiivsed emotsioonid võivad 
olla üksteisest suhteliselt sõltumatud (Watson & Clark, 1992), ja (3) isiksuse 
üks paremaid kirjeldamisviise on viie-faktoriline mudel (Costa & McCrae, 
1992). Väitekirjas uuritakse esmalt erinevate ilmastikutingimuste mõju positiiv-
setele ja negatiivsetele emotsioonidele ning ka väsimusega seotud tunnetele 
(Uurimus I) – päikesepaiste positiivne ning vihma ja sombuse ilma negatiivne 
mõju meeleolule on tavauskumustes laialt levinud. Järgnevalt võetakse vaatluse 
alla kahe lingvistiliselt vastandliku emotsiooni, rõõmu ja kurbuse, üheaegselt 
kogemise võimalikkus (Uurimus II). Kahes esimeses uurimuses on kasutatud 
kogemuse väljavõtte meetodit, mis võimaldab subjektiivseid kogemusi uurida 
reaalajas, sõltumata erinevatest mälukalletest, ning nende loomulikus toimumis-
keskkonnas (Uurimused I ja II). Järgmises uurimuses käsitletakse emotsio-
naalse kogemuse ja isiksuse mõju episoodilise mälu fenomenoloogiale – 
täpsemalt mälestuste taaskogemise ja vaimse ajarände tundele (Uurimus III). 
Edasi analüüsitakse subjektiivse heaolu erinevate koostisosade, afektiivse ja 
kognitiivse komponendi, omavahelisi seoseid. Eriliselt on vaatluse all afektiivse 
kogemuse ja eluga rahulolu hinnangute seosed, ning analüüsitakse ka seda, 
kuidas erinevad kultuurilise tasandi tegurid neid seoseid mõjutavad. Uuringus 
kõrvutatakse 21 riiki, kasutades selleks esinduslikku Euroopa Sotsiaaluuringu 
andmestikku (Uurimus IV). Emotsionaalseid kogemusi ei ole teatavasti võima-
lik ilma sõnadeta kirjeldada, kuid emotsioonisõnade tähendused võivad keeleti 
ja kultuuriti mõnevõrra erineda. Viimases uuringus analüüsitaksegi konkreetse 
emotsioonisõna (viha) tähendusruumi erinevusi ja sarnasusi kahes lingvistiliselt 
lähedases keeles (Uurimus V).  
 
Väitekirja peamised tulemused ja järeldused on järgmised: 
 Ilmastikutingimuste mõju inimeste prototüüpsetele emotsioonidele on suhte-
liselt väike. Positiivseid emotsioone suurendab mõningal määral päikese-
paiste ning nii positiivset kui negatiivset afekti intensiivistab temperatuuri 
tõus, kuid tunduvalt olulisem mõju on ilmal siiski füsioloogilise aluspõhjaga 
seisunditele, nagu unisusele ja väsimusele. Nimelt väheneb väsimus seoses 
õhusoojuse ja päikesevalguse hulga suuremisega (Uurimus I). 
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 Inimesed kogevad suurt rõõmu ja suurt kurbust üheaegselt väga harva. 
Samas, kui ühte emotsiooni kogetakse nõrgal tasemel, on samal ajahetkel 
võimalik teist emotsiooni ükskõik millise tugevusega tunda. Seega on mõned 
inimesed võimelised olema korraga nii rõõmsad kui kurvad. Hetketasandi 
segaemotsioone kogevad suurema tõenäosusega inimesed, kes saavad 
madalama tulemuse meelekindluse ning kõrgemad tulemused neurootilisuse, 
ekstravertsuse ja avatus kogemusele skaaladel (Uurimus II). 
 Retrospektiivselt hinnatud segaemotsioonid mõjutavad inimeste eluga rahul-
olu hinnanguid, kuid eraldiseisvana on positiivse ja negatiivse afekti toime 
siiski märgatavalt suurem. Seega lähtuvad inimesed oma eluga rahulolu 
hinnates nii positiivsete emotsioonide rohkusest kui negatiivsete emotsioo-
nide vähesusest. Samas annab üldisesse heaolusse oma väikese lisapanuse 
siiski ka emotsionaalne keerukus ehk segaemotsioonide kogemise määr 
(Uurimus IV). 
 Emotsioonide sügavus ja variatiivsus (mida Uurimuses III mõõdeti nii 
isiksuseseadumuste kui retrospektiivselt kogetud afektina) mõjutab oluliselt 
seda, kuidas inimesed meenutavad oma minevikku. Seda, kuivõrd rännatakse 
mõtetes tagasi möödunud aegadesse ning elatakse uuesti läbi erinevaid 
sündmusi, mõjutab ühelt poolt emotsioonide intensiivsus (O3: Tundelisus), 
aga ka inimese seadumus kogeda nii positiivse (E6: Rõõmsameelsus ja retro-
spektiivne positiivne afekt) kui negatiivse (N3: Masendus) valentsiga 
emotsioone. Mälestuste taaskogemist iseloomustab ilmselt ka positiivsuse 
kalle – mida positiivsemaks hinnatakse mälestust, seda suuremal määral seda 
subjektiivselt taaskogetakse (Uurimus III). 
 Emotsionaalne kogemus ei ole erinevates riikides eluga rahulolu hinnangute 
andmisel võrdselt oluline, sest olevalt kultuurilistest teguritest võivad 
inimesed positiivsetele ja negatiivsetele tunnetele ebavõrdset kaalu omistada. 
Näiteks, Uurimuses IV selgus, et positiivsed ja segaemotsioonid võimen-
davad eluga rahulolu hinnanguid üle kogu Euroopa, kuid eriti just riikides, 
kus väärtustatakse pigem ellujäämise kui eneseväljendusega seotud väärtu-
seid. Seega on afekti ja subjektiivse heaolu analüüsimine erinevates kultuu-
rides väga oluline, kasutades sealjuures kindlasti ka riigiti esinduslikke 
valimeid. 
 Kultuuridevahelistes emotsiooniuuringutes võivad tekkida mitmed sama-
väärsust või ekvivalentsust puudutavad probleemid. Ühena neist keerdküsi-
mustest võib välja tuua emotsioonisõnade tähenduste võrreldavuse, mis 
kerkib eriti esile siis, kui rahvusvaheliste uuringute tarbeks tõlgitakse termi-
neid otse ühest keelest teise. Inglisekeelsed emotsioonisõnad ei ole aga alati 
üheselt teistesse keeltesse tõlgitavad. Arvestades seda, et isegi eesti ja soome 
keeles sõna „viha“ tähendused veidi erinevad (Uurimus V), ilmestub, kui 
oluline on sõnatähenduste rikkust ja variatiivsust arvesse võtta ka lingvis-
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